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INTRODUCTION
Financing against the security of after-acquired personal property
has traditionally been a risky endeavor for the secured creditor. Pur-
chasers of the after-acquired property and creditors with liens upon it
have often been held to have interests superior to the secured creditor's;
his financing arrangement has frequently become a partly or wholly
unsecured transaction. When an after-acquired property clause was
applied to inventory, accounts receivable, or both, the risks to the
financer multiplied. Many courts were quick to find fraud-in-law in a
scheme that permitted continuing shift in the debtor's stock and ac-
counts as goods were sold and receivables collected-especially when
the debtor was given complete freedom to dispose of the chattels and
proceeds.' Characterized by narrow legal distinctions and stringent
requirements, the body of law surrounding secured transactions has
been and remains highly complex and confusing for even the most
skilled.2
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code was drafted to reduce
the complexity of financing against personalty in secured commercial
transactions.3 Its success cannot be definitively determined at present
since its provisions have barely been subject to the tests of litigation in
the five states which have adopted the Code.' It is fair to predict,
* The author is indebted to Professor Grant Gilmore of the Yale Law School
who suggested the topic for this Article and whose comments and criticisms were
invaluable.
- B.A., 1956, LL.B., 1959, Yale University.
1 For a discussion of the common-law fraud doctrines see Cohen & Gerber,
Mortgages of Merchandise, 39 COLUM. L. Ray. 1338 (1939). Benedict v. Ratner,
268 U.S. 353 (1925), is the leading case influencing the fraud-in-law doctrine on
assignments of accounts receivable. For the implications and complexities of using
accounts receivable as collateral see Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 402 (1958). The doc-
trine of Benedict has also been applied in the field of tangible chattel financing. See
Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 1024, 1036 (1958). See also Cohen & Gerber, Mortgages of
Accounts Receivable, 29 GEo. L.J. 555, 559 (1941).
2 For a comprehensive treatment of the problems and difficulties of personal
property financing see Gilmore, Chattel Security (pts. 1-2), 57 YALE L.J. 517, 761
(1948).
3 See UNIFoan COMMERCIAL CODE [hereinafter cited as UCC] § 9-101, comment.
4 Conn. Acts 1959, Public Act No. 133 (effective Oct. 1, 1961); Ky. Acts 1958,
ch. 77, at 214 (effective July 1, 1960) ; MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 106 (1958) ; N.H. Laws
1959, ch. 247, § 1 (effective July 1, 1961) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A (1954), as amended,
Pa. Laws 1959, No. 426 (effective Jan. 1, 1960).
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however, that it should make for a safer and more flexible system of
financing.
The core of article 9 is the "floating lien" whereby a seller or
lender may obtain as collateral for credit a security interest in virtually
all of his debtor's property, tangible and intangible.5 If provided for
in the security agreement, the security interest can cover goods held for
resale,' shifting masses of property,7 proceeds arising from sale of
secured property,' and practically all property to be acquired in the
future. A secured creditor can insulate himself from the claims of
subsequent purchasers and third party creditors 10 by compliance with
the simple notice filing provisions " which perfect the security interest.'2
Only holders of prior security interests in the property,13 holders of
purchase money secured interests prior or subsequent,' 4 and purchasers
in the ordinary course of business of property held by the debtor for
resale,'" can prevail over the holder of the perfected security interest.
But the real threat to article 9 transactions is posed by the trustee
in bankruptcy; 16 and this is so despite an attempt by the drafters to
frame the Code provisions in a manner designed to escape the wide
avoidance powers of the trustee. By section 60 of the Bankruptcy
Act,'8 the trustee can void certain transfers (including secured financing
agreements) as preferences even though there has been strict com-
pliance with the state law governing security perfection; transfer to a
creditor within four months of bankruptcy in full or partial satisfaction
5 See UCC § 9-204, comment 3.
6ucc §§ 9-205, -201.
7 UCC §§ 9-205, -204, -201.
8 ucc §§ 9-306, -205.
9 UCC §§ 9-204, -108.
10 UCC §§ 9-201, -301, -303, -204.
"1 UCC §§ 9-402, -403.
12 See UCC § 9-312 on priorities and §§ 9-302, -303, -304, -305, -306, -204 and
cross references for the necessary steps in perfection.
'3 UCC § 9-312.
14 UCC §§ 312(3), (4). See note 107 infra.
15 UCC § 9-307.
16 Bankruptcy has always been "the crucible in which security is tested." Everett,
Securing Security, 16 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 49 (1951). See Moore & Tone, Pro-
posed Bankruptcy Amendments: Improvement or Retrogression?, 57 YALE L.J. 683,
691-92 (1948), where it is stated that "Section 60 has always been and is . . .
[designed] . . . to give the trustee the power to avoid certain transactions de-
nominated as preferential although no creditor could attack them under state law."
17 See UCC § 9-108, comment 1. See also text following note 97 infra. For
articles dealing with the impact of bankruptcy on article 9 see Countryman, The
Secured Tramactions Article of the Commercial Code and Section 60 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 16 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROB. 76 (1951). See also Comment, 2 VILx. L.
REv. 395 (1957). Two excellent symposia on secured commercial transactions and
the UCC appear in volumes 13 and 16 of Law and Contemporary Problems.
1830 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §96 (1958) [hereinafter cited by
act section number].
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of an antecedent debt is voidable if all the other elements of a preference
exist.'9 Such property may be reached by the trustee for the benefit
of all the general creditors.
Under section 60 it becomes essential to the financer to determine
if and when the acquisition of a secured interest in after-acquired prop-
erty under a security agreement becomes a transfer for an antecedent
debt. On the assumption that an after-acquired property transaction
could be so held preferential under the other provisions of the Code, the
Code's draftsmen inserted what is now section 9-108, which provides
that as to future property acquired by the debtor in the ordinary course
of business or pursuant to a contract of purchase contemplated by the
security agreement, the property will be deemed to be taken for new
value and not transferred for an antecedent debt. This is so whether
or not new value was in fact given at the time the future property was
acquired:
"Where a secured party makes an advance, incurs an obligation,
releases a perfected security interest, or otherwise gives new value
which is to be secured in whole or in part by after-acquired prop-
erty his security interest in the after-acquired property shall be
deemed to be taken for new value and not as security for an
antecedent debt if the debtor acquires his rights in such collateral
either in the ordinary course of business or under a contract of
purchase made pursuant to the security agreement within a reason-
able time after new value is given."
The purpose of this Article is to analyze the problems raised by
section 9-108. One cannot predict with assurance whether this section,
as it now exists, will prevent the trustee from utilizing section 60 to
overturn security interests claimed under after-acquired property
clauses, but it is submitted that it is questionable whether a Code-
sanctioned after-acquired property interest, even in the absence of
section 9-108, is subject to challenge as a preference. In exploring these
problems it will be necessary to trace the origin of after-acquired prop-
erty concepts and the history of their treatment in bankruptcy under
preference attack. It will also be necessary to examine the develop-
ment of section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. It is hoped that such a study
19 There are essentially six elements of a preference. Under present bankruptcy
law, if the debtor (1) makes or suffers to be made a transfer of his property (2) to
or for the benefit of a creditor (3) for or on account of an antecedent debt (4) while
insolvent and (5) within four months of filing the bankruptcy petition (6) the effect
of which will be to enable the creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt
than some other creditor of the same class, then the debtor has effected a preference.
Section 60a(1). But in order to avoid a transfer and to recover its value from
the creditor the trustee must prove that the creditor had actual knowledge or reason-
able cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent Section 60b.
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will support the author's contentions that section 9-108: (1) is probably
unnecessary; (2) is quite likely self-defeating; (3) attempts, however,
to bring about a commercially desirable result; and (4) should be re-
written or amended to effectuate this result.
ORIGIN OF THE AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY CLAUSE
An after-acquired property clause is a provision in a security
agreement which gives the secured creditor, as additional collateral,
property to be acquired by the debtor subsequent to the execution of the
agreement. The property acquired in the future becomes a part of the
collateral by virtue of the original instrument, although, as will be
indicated below, some further act of transfer may be needed to perfect
the secured creditor's interest in this property.
The most common early financing instrument was the chattel
mortgage on tangible property. Prior to the 19th Century a clause in
a mortgage attempting to encumber after-acquired personal property
gave rise to no specifically enforceable property interest, although an
action for damages might lie for breach of the clause.20 The reason
given by those early courts was simply that "'a man cannot grant or
charge that which he hath not.' "21 But* the early hostility to such
clauses was eventually broken by the persistent efforts of secured
creditors. The mortgage on after-acquired property became effective
to create a property right (lien) in the future property, and the charge
was sufficient to prevail over third party creditors, purchasers and
subsequent mortgagees. 22
At first property already in existence but not yet owned was held
transferable in a mortgage; then property with potential existence
could be made part of the collateral; and finally property to be created in
the future was given this same status. Within this framework states
developed their own rules of limitations on the types of future property
that could be embraced by an after-acquired property clause.2 3 Thus
while one state might have allowed a mortgage upon future property
connected with the business of the mortgagor, another might have
limited such a mortgage to increases in animal livestock.24
20 Williston, Transfers of After-Acquired Personal Property, 19 HARv. L. REv.
557 (1906). The clause was treated as a contractual obligation but it was not
specifically enforceable at the outset The action for damages, of course, was worth-
less if the debtor was insolvent.
21 Cohen & Gerber, The After-Acquired Property Clause, 87 U. PA. L. REv. 635
(1939) (quoting from PERINs, PRoFiTABLE BooK * 15).
2 2 Id. at 638.
23 Blair, The Allocation of After-Acquired Mortgaged Property Among Rival
Claimants, 40 HARv. L. REv. 222 (1926).
2 4 See Cohen & Gerber, supra note 21, at 640, comparing early Michigan and
Kentucky security law.
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Mitchell v. Winslow, 5 decided in 1843, was the first American
case clearly establishing the rights of the mortgagee upon bankruptcy of
the mortgagor. Here the mortgage, covering machinery, tools, and
the mortgagor's stock in trade, contained an after-acquired property
clause; it was properly recorded under Maine law at the time the con-
sideration for the mortgage was given. When the mortgagor became
a bankrupt under the 1841 Bankruptcy Act, Mr. Justice Story found
that the mortgage was perfected as to all creditors at the date of recorda-
tion. He held that the mortgage on the after-acquired property was
therefore valid and effective as to the general creditors in the proceed-
ings, analogizing from present assignments of future claims and ex-
pectancies which equity held superior to the subsequent "legal" claims
of other parties. The mortgagee had taken possession of the goods
prior to the institution of the proceedings,26 but Story ignored that fact
in arriving at his decision. He was concerned that a secret transaction
might be fraudulent, but given the recordation of the mortgage, this
concern was satisfied. He wrote: "[I]t is true, that the assignment
[mortgage] can have no positive operation to transfer, in presenti,
property in things not in esse; but it operates by way of present contract,
to take effect and attach to the things assigned, when and as soon as they
come in esse; and it may be enforced as such a contract in rem, in
equity." 27
Such a lien on after-acquired property was "equitable" not because
it lacked validity against third parties, but merely because of the forum
in which it was technically enforceable, the courts of chancery. The
recordation provided the requisite notice to perfect the transfer against
all third parties except prior lien holders.28 So long as there were words
of present transfer, as distinguished from a naked promise to give a lien
in the future,29 the future property became automatically liened when
acquired. The perfection of the original agreement was then sufficient
in itself to perfect the lien on the after-acquired property. This rule of
complete validity by virtue of the automatic attachment of the mortgage
25 17 Fed. Cas. 527 (No. 9673) (Story, Circuit Justice, 1843).
26 Id. at 529.
2 7 Id. at 531.
28 Williston, supra note 20, at 561, analogizes the transaction to sales law where
"any act of appropriation by the seller which has been assented to by the buyer in
advance suffices to pass [legal] title," adding that "the recording acts and [certain
doctrines] . . . may invalidate such a title." But note that in Mitchell v. Winslow,
Story has given full effect to the title of the mortgagee, which is not reduced by the
recording act but rather protected by it, and that no specific appropriation is required
to bind the future goods.
29Union Trust Co. v. Bulkeley, 150 Fed. 510 (6th Cir. 1907), describes this
requirement. See discussion of the case at text accompanying notes 65-67 infra.
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lien to subsequently acquired property will for purposes of this Article
be denominated the "automatic perfection rule." 30
Some of the states were willing to accept the automatic perfec-
tion rule.31  Some refused altogether to sanction the use of an after-
acquired property clause in chattel mortgages.32  The majority of states
arrived at an intermediate position hereinafter referred to as the
"Massachusetts rule." 3 Under the Massachusetts rule, a chattel
mortgage with an after-acquired property clause created a valid and
enforceable lien between the parties (mortgagor and mortgagee), but
the lien was unperfected as to third parties until the mortgagee took
possession of the future property or until the execution of a supplemental
mortgage. Any levying of lien creditor or purchaser intervening before
the mortgagee took possession could prevail over the mortgagee.
The mortgagee in a Massachusetts-rule state was also said to have
an "equitable lien." However, it must be emphasized that the "equitable
lien" in automatic-perfection states is not the same as the "equitable
lien" in states subscribing to the Massachusetts rule of perfection. The
former is equitable in name only, for it is for all other purposes as fully
30 It has also been referred to as the "equity rule." Cohen & Gerber, supra note
21, at 638. The rule was stated by Pomeroy: "It is well settled that an agreement
to charge, or to assign, or to give security upon, or to affect property not yet in
existence, or in the ownership of the party making the contract, or property to be
acquired by him in the future, although . . . it creates no legal estate or interest
in the things when they afterwards come into existence or are acquired by the
promisor, does constitute an equitable lien upon the property so existing or acquired
at a subsequent time, which is enforced in the same manner and against the same
parties as a lien upon specific things existing and owned by the contracting party at
the date of the contract." 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1236, at 2966 (4th
ed. 1918), quoted in Union Trust Co. v. Townshend, 101 F.2d 903, 909 (4th Cir.
1939). The position is similar to that taken by Professor Cook in The Alienability
of Choses in Action, 30 HARV. L. REv. 449 (1917). Cook emphasized that the term
"equitable" often embraces jural relations which are "concurrently legal and equitable,
i.e., recognized and sanctioned both by common law and by equity." Id. at 455.
31 The jurisdictions which adhered to the automatic perfection rule as against
at least some third parties were listed by Cohen and Gerber in 1939 as Alabama,
Arizona, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming. Cohen & Gerber, supra note
21, at 638 nn.15-17. The author has not made an exhaustive independent study of
the states and therefore cannot assure that the list is complete or current. Certainly
New Mexico should be added. Joe Heaston Tractor & Implement Co. v. Claussen,
59 N.M. 486, 287 P.2d 57 (1955).
32 See Whiteside v. Rocky Mountain Fuel Co., 101 F.2d 765, 769-70 (10th Cir.
1938), aff'd on rehearing, 101 F.2d 771, 771-72 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S.
640 (1939) (court does recognize equitable lien on after-acquired property). See note
50 infra.
3 Following the Massachusetts rule were Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Maine,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wis-
consin. Cohen & Gerber, supra note 21, at 639 nn.19-22. See note 31 supra. Other
states followed a combination of the two rules. E.g., in New York the Massachusetts
rule applies to intervening lien creditors, who can prevail over the mortgagee by
establishing their lien before the mortgagee takes possession. Rochester Distilling
Co. v. Rasey, 142 N.Y. 570, 37 N.E. 632 (1894). But the recorded mortgage on
after-acquired property is automatically perfected against subsequent purchasers, who
take subject to the lien. Kribbs v. Alford, 120 N.Y. 519, 24 N.E. 811 (1890).
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effective as any legal consensual lien of a mortgage of presently owned
property. The latter is something less than this, being equitable in the
sense that it lacks the full validity that would be needed to defeat inter-
vening legal lien creditors. It is something in the nature of an im-
perfect or defective lien, giving the mortgagee "some," but not "full"
rights in the property. 4 Without some further act by the mortgagee,
the lien on the future property is not perfected.
SECTION 60 IN ITS HISTORICAL SETTING
Before analyzing the impact of the bankruptcy preference section
on after-acquired property clauses, there are two historically significant
areas that require exploration. First it is necessary to have an under-
standing of the development that section 60 has undergone in the past
sixty years. Second it is essential to point out some of the differences
between the "equitable lien" on after-acquired property discussed above
and the "equitable lien" on defective present transfers. A grasp of the
problems in these two areas is fundamental to the analysis attempted by
this Article.
The Development of Section 60
For ease of classification section 60 can be regarded as having
undergone three states of development: 1898 to 1938, 1938 to 1950,
and 1950 to the present.
Under section 60a of the 1898 act 3 5 a preference was defined as
a transfer of property by an insolvent debtor for an antecedent debt,
thereby enabling a creditor to recover a greater percentage of his debt
than other creditors of the same class. The trustee was given the power
under section 60b to avoid any such transfer made within four
months of bankruptcy if the creditor had reasonable cause to believe it
was a preference. But section 60 contained no perfection clause to
determine the point in time at which the transfer was to be deemed
made 3 6-- a point which is critical when the transfer is by security
34 Cook has pointed out the polyvalence and potential ambiguity of the term
"equitable." See note 30 supra. The Massachusetts rule "equitable lien" is not
possessed of the same characteristics as the "equitable lien" of the automatic-perfection
jurisdictions. Thus the utilization in this context of the rubric "equitable," which,
as Cook has warned, fails to indicate adequately all of the attributes of the particular
jural relations involved, can only be misleading.
35 Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 60(a), 30 Stat 562.
36 See 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 60.37, at 877-78 (14th ed. 1956) [hereinafter
cited as COLLIER], MOORE & COUNTRYMAN, DEBTORs' AND CREDITORS' RIGHTs 800-01
(1951).
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instrument such as a mortgage. 7  Thus, a mortgagee could withhold
his interest in the mortgagor's property from the record until the eve
of bankruptcy and still escape the thrust of the preference challenge; in
the meanwhile third parties would be misled by the appearance of a
sound credit status of the mortgagor. Because the secrecy of the
transaction was prejudicial to the general creditors of the debtor,
Congress sought to make explicit that this situation would be treated
as a preference.
However, in subsequent amendments " the statutory language em-
ployed fell short of accomplishing its aim, although the legislative objec-
tive was perfectly clear: "This proposed amendment squarely and
clearly makes the date of the recording (where recording is required
under state law to make the lien valid as against levying creditors) the
date at which the [levying] creditor is to prove the existence of all the
elements of a preference. . . ." " The courts, failing to look to the
legislative history, held many eve-of-bankruptcy recordations to be non-
preferential,40 stating that although section 60 made clear that the four
month period began running from the date of recordation, all the ele-
ments of a preference-and, more specifically, the antecedence of the
mortgagee's consideration-were to be determined as of the date of the
execution of the mortgage.4"
It was not until 1938 that Congress was able to frame an effective
perfection clause. This version 42 provided that a transfer was to be
deemed made when it became so far perfected under state law that no
bona fide purchaser from the debtor could obtain rights in the property
superior to those of the secured creditor. It is evident that this perfec-
tion test required not only that the four month period begin running
from the date of perfection (ordinarily recording), but that all the
elements of preference be determined as of that time as well. If there
was a delay in recording until the eve of bankruptcy, the act of recorda-
tion became a transfer for a debt that was then antecedent.
But the 1938 bona fide purchaser test proved unsatisfactory also.
This time the pendulum had swung too far, for now all inventory
37 Assume, for example, a mortgage executed at time X1 for a contemporaneous
consideration, but not recorded until time X2, on the eve of bankruptcy of the mort-
gagor. This early § 60 did not require that time X2 be the date at which the transfer
was to be deemed made. Hence the courts held that the mortgage was not preferential
even though at X2, when it was first perfected, the debt was antecedent.
38 Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, § 13, 32 Stat. 799; Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412,
§ 11, 36 Stat. 842; Act of May 27, 1926, ch. 406, § 14, 44 Stat. 666.
39 S. REP. No. 691, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1910), concurring in H.R. REP. No.
511, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910).
40 See 3 COLLIER § 60.37, at 878-84.
41 Ibid. See also MooRE & COUNTRYmAN, op. cit. supra note 36, at 801-02.
42Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 869.
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transactions were subjected to the risk of being set aside as preferences.
Since effective financing by secured transactions covering goods held for
resale must permit the debtor to sell the property to a purchaser free
of encumbrances, the secured interest in such property could never be
perfected as against bona fide purchasers. The unperfected interest
would therefore be inevitably preferential if all the other requisite ele-
ments were present.43 To rectify this situation, the 1950 amendment
to section 60 was enacted."
Under the 1950 amendment 4 5 the bona fide purchaser test was
replaced with a lien creditor test of perfection for all personal property
transfers. Thus the present status of section 60 is that transfers of
personalty that are perfected under state law as against any subsequent
lien creditor are perfected as against the trustee in bankruptcy. All the
elements of a preference are determined at, and the four month period
begins running from, such date of perfection.
At this stage it is well to point out that one evil which the legis-
lators sought to eliminate by the amendments was the secret unrecorded
mortgage on presently owned property.46 But there was another
object too that drew the legislative fire: this was the problem of the
secret equitable lien. As already observed, "equitable lien" labels were
attached to after-acquired property transactions by both Massachusetts
and automatic perfection rules. But the equitable lien also arose in the
context of the defective transfer of presently owned property. It is to
the problem of the ubiquitous equitable lien in bankruptcy that this
analysis now turns.
Equitable Liens
The equitable lien on transfers of personalty has been found by
judicial construction in so many different situations that it has become
43 Discussions of the impact of the bona fide purchaser test on inventory trans-
actions have been numerous. See 3 COLLIER § 60.38, at 904; Moore & Tone, supra
note 16; Oglebay, Proposed Revision of Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act: A Step
Backwards, 51 COmmERCIAL L.J. 263 (1946); Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 828 (1948).
44 There is no intention here to underestimate the impact of Corn Exchange Natl
Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943). The Supreme Court there
invalidated a non-notification assignment of accounts receivable which was deemed
unperfected under Pennsylvania law. Because many jurisdictions followed the Penn-
sylvania rule requiring notification of assignment to perfect, bona fide assignment
transactions were jeopardized by the court's preference finding. Agitation for
amendment to § 60 followed this case. But since most states circumvented the thrust
of Klauder by passing non-notification and other statutes, there was little real need
for an amended § 60 in this area. For a comprehensive treatment of the Klander
case and its implications see Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 402 (1958).
45 64 Stat. 24 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1958).
46There can be no doubt that the element of secrecy was strongly influential in
directing much of the legislation: "the long history of § 60 gave evidence of repeated
legislative attempts to strike down what might well be termed 'secret transfers' by
the debtor-that is, transfers executed but not disclosed by recordation registration,
change of possession, or the like, so that other creditors were not apprised ... "
Oglebay, supra note 43, at 263.
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a catch-all term that does not lend itself to accurate definition. The
equitable lien arose most typically in situations where there were con-
tracts to mortgage but where no mortgage had in fact been executed; 48
or where a mortgage had been executed defectively and was never
corrected, therefore not qualifying for recordation; 49 or where there
was a contractual agreement providing for security upon some property
that could not be embraced by a chattel mortgage or some other legally
sanctioned security instrument. 0 These equitable liens, although never
fully perfected as against bona fide purchasers, were often held to be
superior to the rights of subsequent lien creditors: 51 the lien was said
to "relate back" to the date of the execution of the instrument creating
it.
In Sexton v. Kessler," a classic case involving an equitable pledge,
the debtor segregated some corporate securities in his vault and ear-
marked them as collateral securing a loan made by a creditor. The
creditor was notified that the collateral had been segregated, but the
debtor did not at that time part with possession. Within the four
month period before bankruptcy the creditor took possession and the
trustee sued to set aside this transfer as a preference. The United
States Supreme Court, applying New York law, said that the agree-
ment between the parties gave rise to an equitable pledge, and that the
creditor (equitable pledgee) was entitled to possession of the property.
The Court stated: "[A] general promise to give security . . . is not
enough. . . . [But this agreement] purported not to promise but to
transfer; and the subject-matter was not goods and chattels in the sense
of the New York mortgage law as we understand that law to be
interpreted .. . . 8 Therefore the agreement did not have to be
47 See In re Interborough Consolidated Corp., 288 Fed. 334, 349 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 262 U.S. 752 (1923), where the court comments upon the fact that the term
is "intensely undefined." For collection of cases and discussion of the impact of
"equitable liens" on presently owned property see 3 COLLIER § 60.37, at 885-90. Cf.
Britton, Equitable Liens-A Tentative Analysis of the Problem, 8 N.C.L. Riv. 388
(1930); Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 828 (1948).
48 E.g., Porter v. Searle, 228 F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1955).
49 3 COLLIER § 60.37, at 886.
50 "Considering the nature of an equitable lien, how it may be created and its
constituent elements, it would be difficult indeed to conceive how the chattel mortgage
act could be complied with by the holder of such equitable lien. The chattel mortgage
act requires that the mortgage itself, the physical document, shall be filed or recorded.
True, a written statement of the facts that go to constitute an equitable lien could
be made, a verification of the truthfulness thereof attached, and as thus made up it
could be filed with the county clerk and recorder, but no intention to require that
such action be taken can be deduced from the chattel mortgage act, or any Colorado
statute." Whiteside v. Rocky Mountain Fuel Co., 101 F.2d 765, 769 (10th Cir. 1938),
aff'd on rehearing, 101 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 640 (1939).
51 Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 828, 839 (1948).
52225 U.S. 90 (1911).
53Id. at 98.
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recorded as a chattel mortgage, and possession was all that was needed
to perfect the equitable pledge, which then related back to the date of
the agreement. The Court concluded that the taking of possession was
non-preferential: "When the [creditor] . . . took the securities it
only exercised a right that had been created long before the bankruptcy
and in good faith." "'
The equitable pledge lacked notoriety in that it could not, of course,
be recorded; failure to transfer the collateral at the time of the agreement
prevented it from being a legally perfected pledge. These secret equi-
table liens, like the unrecorded but otherwise valid mortgage transfers
discussed above, were felt by Congress to present the evils of preferences,
and the 1938 amendment sought to eliminate them. Since an equitable
lien on present goods would not prevail over a bona fide purchaser, the
1938 bona fide purchaser test overcame the nemesis of the defective
equitable lien.
When the 1950 amendment was passed to rectify the undesirable
severity of the 1938 test, the legislators, not wanting to revive the
equitable lien and relation back doctrines, 5 inserted section 60a(6)
which provides:
"The recognition of equitable liens where available means of per-
fecting legal liens have not been employed is declared to be contrary
to the policy of this section. If a transfer is for security and if (A)
applicable law requires a signed and delivered writing, or a delivery
of possession, or a filing or recording, or other like overt action as
a condition to its full validity against third persons other than a
buyer in the ordinary course of trade claiming through or under
the transferor and (B) such overt action has not been taken, and
(C) such transfer results in the acquisition of only an equitable
lien, then such transfer is not perfected within the meaning of
[section 60a(2)].. "
The legislative history and the background of the 1938 and 1950
amendments clearly indicate the evils at which the legislation was
directed. Two of these have been discussed: the unrecorded mortgage
and the agreement creating an equitable lien on presently owned prop-
erty. A third was the chattel mortgage with an after-acquired property
clause in a Massachusetts-rule state, for this clause also created an
unperfected "equitable lien" which required the doctrine of relation
back to protect it in bankruptcy."6
54 Id. at 99.
55 "The objectives of . . . the bill are as follows: (A) To retain unimpaired
the basic object of the 1938 amendment, which eliminated the 'relation back' doctrine
of Sexton v. Kessler . . . ." H.R. REP. No. 1293, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949).
5 6 1t should be emphasized here that automatically perfected after-acquired
property liens, unlike Massachusetts-rule liens, were not unperfected: these former
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PREFERENCE ATTACK ON THE AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY CLAUSE
Within this framework of the preference history and the concepts
of after-acquired property and equitable liens, the treatment of the
after-acquired property clause in bankruptcy must be explored in detail.
The Massachusetts Rule-Pre-1938
Under the pre-1938 section 60, the trustee's contention that taking
possession of after-acquired property within four months of bankruptcy
constituted a preferential transfer for an antecedent debt was generally
unsuccessful. Two early Supreme Court cases provided the precedent
in the field. In Thompson v. Fairbanks 57 the debtor executed for con-
temporaneous consideration a mortgage covering his stock in trade
presently owned and to be thereafter acquired. The mortgagee re-
corded the instrument in full compliance with Vermont law more than
four months before the mortgagor became a bankrupt, but did not take
possession of the goods until the eve of bankruptcy. The trustee sued
to recover the goods or their value, contending that the after-acquired
goods were transferred for a then antecedent debt. The Court, finding
that there was no fraud and that recordation had been effected, asserted:
"So in this case, although there was no actual existing lien upon
this after-acquired property until the taking of possession, yet there
was a positive agreement, as contained in the mortgage and
so-called "equitable liens' were never subject to defeat by third parties provided the
original instrument was formally perfected. The legislative history nowhere gives
any indication that such liens were to be eliminated or struck down as preferences.
See notes 100-03 infra and accompanying text. Admittedly where there was an agree-
ment creating an automatically perfected equitable lien on future property which yet
remained unrecorded, then the transaction would seem to fall within the purview
of the post-1938 § 60 (see Whiteside v. Rocky Mountain Fuel Co., 101 F.2d 765 (10th
Cir. 1938), aff'd on rehearing, 101 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 640
(1939)) for such a transaction, although valid under the pre-1938 act, is certainly
prejudicial to the general creditors. It may be assumed that this device was another
of the evils aimed at by the 1938 amendment. But, it bears repeating, the evil
consists precisely in a lack of notoriety, and where the agreement is recordable and
recorded, there would seem to be no preference problem even under the bona fide
purchaser test of the 1938 § 60. Without notoriety, of course, a bona fide purchaser
can prevail; it is the lack of notice that makes him bona fide. With regard to the
1938 and proposed 1950 amendments it has been asserted that "certainly the creditor
who fully obeys local law by providing the world with notice of his interest in the
debtor's property is not the person against whom Section 60 is aimed." Comment,
57 YALE L.J. 828, 835 (1948). See also Moore & Tone, supra note 16, at 698:
"Recently the fear has been expressed that the bona fide purchaser test will enable
the trustee to invalidate properly filed or recorded trust receipts, factor's liens,
chattel mortgages on goods held for resale and similar legitimate security devices.
. . . Section 60a should be interpreted in the light of its legislative history as
striking at secret liens, previously protected by the doctrine of 'relation back,' not
at legitimate security devices which have been given the full notoriety prescribed by
state law, and which, by their very function, are designed to enable the debtor to
have possession and the power of sale and hence are never perfectible as against the
ordinary purchaser."
67 196 U.S. 516. (1905).
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existing of record, under which the inchoate lien might be asserted
and enforced . . [and it] related back to the time of the execu-
tion . . . as it was only by virtue of that mortgage that posses-
sion could be taken." 58
In Humphrey v. Tatman,9 decided the same year, the Court re-
affirmed its holding in Thompson. Here also the mortgage contained
an after-acquired property clause, but was not recorded when executed.
Being unrecorded, the mortgage was voidable by any lien creditor
intervening before possession was taken; the mortgagee, however, took
possession on the eve of bankruptcy before any creditors intervened.
The Court held that just as possession would prevail over creditors with
respect to the presently owned goods, it would likewise prevail over
creditors with respect to the after-acquired goods. The elements of
a preference were to be determined at the time the mortgage was
executed, and the doctrine of relation back operated to perfect the lien
as of that time. The Court had assumed, "also, without deciding, that
if, as against the trustee, the mortgage is to be regarded as first having
come into being when the mortgagee took possession, it would be
void." 60
The net effect of the Court's holding in each case is that in
Massachusetts-rule states, where the transfer of property under an after-
acquired property clause is unperfected without some further action
being taken,0' the relation back doctrine is essential and its invocation
is effective to insulate the lien on the future property from the trustee's
attack. And this doctrine is not confined to the financing of tangible
property; it applies as well to the assignment of accounts receivable.
In In re Robert Jenkins Corp.2 the assignment provided in part,
". ..we herewith pledge the accounts receivable as may appear on
the ledgers . . . at any time, without reserve . . ." Account
debtors were not notified of the assignment and the debtor was permitted
to collect and apply the proceeds to his own use, so that at the time of
his bankruptcy the only accounts outstanding were those that arose
subsequent to the date of the agreement. But on the eve of bankruptcy
58 Id. at 524.
59 198 U.S. 91 (1905).
60 Id. at 92. This case is representative of two separate evils: lack of notoriety
of the original mortgage and imperfection of the equitable lien until the mortgagee
had taken possession of the future goods.
61 In Massachusetts-rule states the after-acquired property clause is often said
to create an "equitable pledge." "In the absence of statute, the after-acquired property
clause in a mortgage of inventory also is usually viewed as creating an equitable
pledge, under which the mortgagee is entitled to protect his claim of lien by taking
possession of the after-acquisitions .... " Everett, Securing Security, 16 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 49, 55 (1951).
62 17 F.2d 555 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 527 (1927).
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a schedule of the outstanding accounts was delivered to the creditor.
The trustee argued that the whole transaction was fraudulent under the
doctrine of Benedict v. Ratner.3 But the court found that the Benedict
doctrine was inapplicable in Massachusetts, and that there was no
preferential transfer-following the reasoning of Thompson and Hum-
phrey. The original agreement created a security interest in the nature
of equitable title in the future accounts, which equitable title ripened
into a fully perfected legal title by virtue of the delivery of the schedule
of accounts. The act of delivery created a legal lien which related back
to the date of the agreement at which time there were none of the
elements of a preference. Of course, if the mortgagee seized the after-
acquired goods after the petition in bankruptcy was filed, he lost his
equitable lien by virtue of its being unperfected at a time when the
trustee acquired the power of an intervening lien creditor.64
The Automatic Perfection Rule-Pre-1938
A paucity of cases dealing with the automatic perfection rule in
the context of section 60 makes analysis in the area difficult. One
can speculate as to the reasons for this paucity: the Benedict and fraud
doctrines of accounts receivable and inventory financing may have
given bankruptcy trustees easier means of setting aside the secured
transactions; a presumption of validity existed in the states where the
issue might have arisen; and, of course, only a few states followed the
automatic perfection rule.
There were no pre-1938 Supreme Court cases challenging as
preferential a transfer under an after-acquired property clause in a
chattel mortgage executed in an automatic-perfection state. In 1907,
however, in Union Trust Co. v. Bulkeley 11 the Sixth Circuit decided a
case that has implications bearing on the issue. Here the creditor
endorsed notes for the debtor, receiving back an assignment of all
present and future accounts receivable. The following year the debtor
became a bankrupt and the trustee collected all moneys due and owing
under the then outstanding accounts receivable. The creditor-assignee
sued to recover the moneys collected. The court's opinion does not
detail the defense of the trustee, but certainly a preference argument
would have been likely under the circumstances. The court held, how-
63268 U.S. 353 (1925). When a case involving after-acquired property runs
afoul of the Benedict rule, there is never any discussion of the preferential transfer
aspects of the case. The court declares the transfer void under the fraud-in-law
doctrine. For illustrative cases see In re Turley, 92 F.2d 944 (7th Cir. 1937) ; In re
Steele, 122 F. Supp. 948 (E.D.N.C. 1954) ; In re Streeter, 20 F.2d 157 (D.N.H. 1927).
64 It re Hurley, 185 Fed. 851 (D. Mass. 1910).
65 150 Fed. 510 (6th Cir. 1907).
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ever, that in the absence of fraud the common law of Michigan recog-
nized, in equity, the assignment of accounts receivable in the future.
"It is true that the subject to be affected by it [the lien] was to be
thereafter acquired; but, when acquired, it would become subject to
the lien without any new or further agreement. This is something
quite different from an executory contract." 66 It is apparent from the
opinion 11 that the lien on future accounts created by the original assign-
ment was equitable in name only. There was no gap in time during
which the accounts were unencumbered, and the lien at all times had
the force and effectiveness of a legal lien, without possession ever hav-
ing been taken.'
In In re Alabama Braid Corp.6" a debtor had executed a mortgage
on all his presently owned property and any property to be acquired
thereafter in the ordinary course of business except property held or to
be held for resale. The mortgage was properly recorded. Several years
later on the eve of the debtor's bankruptcy and at a time when the
mortgagee knew of the debtor's insolvency, the debtor executed a supple-
mental mortgage covering the property acquired subsequent to the date
of the original mortgage. This too was recorded. The trustee sued to
set aside this supplemental mortgage, apparently alleging it to be a
preference.69 The court found that the supplemental mortgage was
avoidable under the Bankruptcy Act, but held that the original mort-
gage, nevertheless, was sufficient to perfect a lien upon all of the present
and future property. The court stated:
"[A] chattel mortgage covering after-acquired property operates
as a present contract which attaches when the property is acquired
or comes into existence, and makes it in equity an effective security
for the debt provided for in the mortgage. Courts of equity will
protect and enforce such equitable title against all but bona fide
purchasers thereof for value without notice. It is not necessary,
in order to perfect such equitable title, that any additional mortgage
be executed or that the mortgagee take possession of such property
after the same is acquired by the mortgagor. Any holder of the
legal title to such property, with notice of such equitable title, holds
such legal title as trustee for the holder of such equitable title.
,, 70
And earlier in its opinion the court wrote: "Under the law of Alabama,
the filing for record in that county in which the property is to be ac-
661d. at 516. (Emphasis added.)
67 Compare In re Hurley, 185 Fed. 851 (D. Mass. 1910). See also the opinion
of the district court quoted in full in the circuit court report. 150 Fed, at 511-15.
68 13 F. Supp. 336 (N.D. Ala. 1935).
69 Although the opinion does not explicitly state the trustee's contention, the
court speaks in terms of present and past consideration and knowledge of insolvency.
70 13 F. Supp. at 339. (Emphasis added.)
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quired of a chattel mortgage covering after-acquired property constitutes
notice of such mortgage from the date the same is filed for record." 71
Thus what the court characterizes as an "equitable lien" it recognizes,
by virtue of the constructive notice attaching by state law to recordation,
as a legal lien: one binding immediately and without further action upon
all supervening third parties. There was no need to invoke a relation
back doctrine because the lien became a continuing one, perfected from
the time the original mortgage was recorded. This case is truly
exemplary of the fact that the use of the term "equitable lien"-ap-
parently a throwback to the old common-law restrictions on financing
against after-acquired property---can be misleading. It cannot be
emphasized too strongly that there are significant differences between
the so-called "equitable lien" of the Alabama Braid case and the "equi-
table lien" of the Thompson case.
In In re Comet Textile,72 a case decided under section 45 of the
New York Personal Property Law, the court did not employ "equitable
lien" language; it focused clearly upon the effect of the lien. Section
45, the Factors Lien Law, had been passed to offset the difficulty and
complexity of financing against inventory. The act provided, inter alia,
for a continuing lien on all present and future inventory goods if certain
statutory requirements of perfection were met. In the Comet case
the creditor-factor had advanced money to the bankrupt and had entered
into a factoring agreement which was fully perfected under the act.
Within four months of the debtor's bankruptcy the factor seized the
goods, and the trustee sued to set aside the transfer of the after-acquired
property as a voidable preference. The court held that the lien on the
goods was perfected at the date of the agreement, and that possession
was not needed to perfect. The factors lien is a continuing, perfected,
non-possessory legal lien: "It follows that the lien is good against
creditors with claims antedating the notice, unless such claims have
been made liens attaching to the merchandise prior to filing of notice." 73
Comet has significance for the automatic perfection classification
of after-acquired property cases because it makes explicit that this
statutory lien is in all respects and from the moment of perfection a fully
perfected legal lien, despite the fact that future property is involved.
This is especially significant since, unlike Massachusetts, New York
had never had a relation back doctrine on after-acquired property financ-
ing through a chattel mortgage. Although New York had followed
71 Ibid.
72 15 F. Supp. 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1936), aff'd per curiam, 91 F.2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1937).
73 Id. at 964.
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the Massachusetts rule of perfection as to creditors, it did not develop a
doctrine of relation back to protect the mortgagee in bankruptcy,74 but
confined the relation back doctrine to unperfected equitable liens on
presently owned property.
The Massachusetts Rule-Post-1938
The 1938 amendment to section 60 changed drastically the treat-
ment of after-acquired property clause transfers in Massachusetts-rule
states having the relation back doctrine. The effect of the 1938 amend-
ment is spelled out clearly in In re Markert,75 where the debtor executed
a mortgage of present and future inventory and present and future
accounts receivable. Two days before the bankruptcy of the debtor,
the mortgagee-assignee took possession of the goods, some of which
were acquired subsequent to the date of the mortgage. The precise
issue in the case was determination of when the transfer of after-
acquired property occurred. In finding the transfer preferential as to
goods, the court reasoned, first, that the after-acquired property clause
created an equitable lien which was not perfected as to bona fide pur-
chasers until two days before bankruptcy, thereby becoming a transfer
for a then antecedent debt; and, second, that the 1938 amendment had
eliminated the relation back doctrine that Massachusetts had heretofore
recognized. As to the future accounts receivable, the court found that
the lien on them was unperfected until the accounts were segregated and
assigned specifically to the mortgagee-assignee, 6 at which time they
were transferred for an antecedent debt and thereby preferential. This
case, dealing as it does with both accounts receivable and tangible
chattels, is the direct sequel to the Humphrey and Jenkins cases of the
pre-1938 era. It establishes that the amendment has accomplished what
the legislators intended: capture of the unperfected equitable lien which
under the relation back doctrine had escaped section 60 in the Massa-
chusetts-rule jurisdictions.77
The 1950 amendment, which utilized a lien creditor test and iso-
lated the equitable lien problem in a separate clause, did not change the
result of the Markert case. The reasoning of that case would still apply
74 For a discussion of the status of New York law on after-acquired property
see Goldstein v. Rusch, 54 F.2d 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1931), modified, 56 F.2d 10 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 287 U.S. 604 (1932). See also Irving Trust Co. v. Commercial Factors
Corp., 68 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1934).
75 45 F. Supp. 661 (D. Mass. 1942).
76 There were some future accounts that had been assigned specifically prior to
the four month period preceding bankruptcy and these were considered perfected.
77Accord, Rosen v. Haines-ce Brook, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 791 (D. Mass. 1943).
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under section 60a(2),"8 since the lien on after-acquired property
would be subject to defeat not only by bona fide purchasers but also by
intervening lien creditors. Furthermore section 60a(6) specifically
makes its own more stringent buyer-in-the-ordinary-course-of-trade test
applicable to "equitable liens," and similarly eliminates the relation
back doctrine.
A recent decision in Illinois, a state which follows the Massa-
chusetts rule, substantiates this conclusion. In Curtis v. Knox 79 a
creditor made a loan to the debtor three years prior to his bankruptcy
and the creditor took back a mortgage on identified machinery. The
mortgage contained an after-acquired property clause. Within four
months preceding bankruptcy the mortgagee foreclosed on the machin-
ery, all of which had been acquired prior to the four month period. The
trustee sued to recover the value of the after-acquired machinery sold
at the foreclosure sale, claiming that the foreclosure proceedings effected
a preferential transfer. The mortgagee contended that an after-acquired
property clause in Illinois creates a lien perfected automatically when
the mortgagor acquires the property and that his lien was therefore
perfected prior to the eve of bankruptcy. The court held, however, that
an after-acquired property clause creates only a legally defective equi-
table lien that is not perfected until possession is taken. The foreclosure
action was equivalent to possession, but at that time it constituted a
transfer for an antecedent debt. The act of perfecting was deemed to
be the making of a transfer.
The Automatic Perfection Rule-Post-1938
Although the 1938 and 1950 amendments have made transfers of
after-acquired property subject to attack as preferences in Massa-
chusetts-rule states, it is submitted that these amendments have not had
the same result in states following an automatic perfection rule. Al-
though neither of two cases found involving chattel mortgages under
the amendments-both decisions governed by the 1950 version-di-
rectly discussed the problem of the preferential transfer, there is signifi-
cance in the fact that the issue was not treated, since certainly, if section
60 was thought to apply, a preference would have had to be found in
each case.
78 "[A] transfer of property other than real property shall be deemed to have
been made or suffered at the time when it became so far perfected that no subsequent
lien upon such property obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple
contract could become superior to the rights of the transferee. . .' Section
60a(2).
79 254 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1958). Accord, in Massachusetts, Matter of Super
Value Mkt., 151 F. Supp. 639 (D. Mass. 1957).
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In Joe Heaston Tractor & Implement Co. v. Claussen " a seller of
merchandise obtained a mortgage on the buyer's stock in trade, includ-
ing after-acquired property. The mortgage was recorded prior to
buyer's bankruptcy but seller never took possession of the goods; after
bankruptcy had supervened he sued the trustee to recover their value.
The court found for the seller-mortgagee and wrote: "there can be no
question of the validity of a chattel mortgage as against subsequent
creditors, on a stock of merchandise left with the mortgagor for sale in
the ordinary course of trade, from the time tof its filing for record." 81
The court held that while any property acquired subsequent to the
execution of the mortgage but prior to recordation was not to be con-
sidered liened, the other after-acquired property was liened automatically
and the mortgagee was entitled to recover its value from the trustee.
Yet, certainly if the case had arisen in a Massachusetts-rule state, the
lien on the after-acquired property could never have stood up as against
the trustee, even under the pre-1938 status of section 60.2 The court
did not discuss equitable liens or anything remotely connected with
antecedent debt or relation back.
In In the Matter of Hayes 3 the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion claimed a secured lien in bankruptcy as mortgagee of, among other
things, some equipment of the bankrupt. The recorded mortgage had
an after-acquired property clause; the property in dispute was future
property of which the creditor had not taken possession. The court
found that the chattel mortgage statute sanctioned after-acquired prop-
erty clauses. The lien of the mortgage attached to the subsequent
acquisitions "'immediately upon the same coming into the possession
of, or under the control of the mortgagor, subject to all valid prior liens,
claims, titles, and encumbrances.'" 84 The original recordation pro-
vided constructive notice to all the world 85 and the lien was perfected
continuously from that time. Thus, despite the failure of the secured
creditor to take possession, he was held to have a superior lien on the
future property.
There is, moreover, a case-decided under the 1938 act-which by
its interpretation of the Factors Lien Act of New Hampshire adds
considerable support to the thesis of this paper that automatically per-
fected liens are not preferential transfers. Manchester Nat'l Bank v.
80 59 N.M. 486, 287 P.2d 57 (1955).
81 Id. at 487, 287 P.2d at 59. (Emphasis added.)
82 See text accompanying notes 61-64 wtrpra.
83 140 F. Supp. 444 (D. Alaska 1956).
84 Id. at 446.
85 "There is no provision of the Alaska statutes requiring re-filing of a chattel
mortgage to cover after-acquired property .... ." Id. at 447.
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Roche "' is a post-1938 companion case to the pre-1938 Comet decision
that comes to the same conclusion as Comet despite the amendment to
section 60. It is significant not merely for its result, but also for its
rationale and for the legislative developments that it seems to have
influenced. In Roche there was a factoring agreement between the
debtor and the factor, who complied with all the requirements for per-
fecting the lien at the date of the agreement. Included within the col-
lateral liened were all accounts receivable presently owned and to be
acquired and, of course, the present and future inventory. Less than
four months before he became a bankrupt the debtor notified the account
debtors that their accounts were assigned to the factor. Despite the
factor's contention to the contrary, the court said that the Factors Lien
Act did not contemplate a general assignment of future accounts in
presenti at the date of the factoring contract; further action was needed
for perfection of the lienor's interest in the accounts. But no such
action was required for perfection of the future additions to inventory;
in effect the Massachusetts rule was applied to accounts and the auto-
matic perfection rule to goods. The court found the basis for its
distinction within the language of the statute:
"[I]t is not without significance that . . . the New Hampshire
legislature specifically provided that the lien on merchandise would
be valid from the time of filing the prescribed notice 'whether such
merchandise shall be in existence at the time of the agreement
creating the lien or at the time of filing such notice or shall come
into existence subsequently thereto or shall subsequently thereto
be acquired by the borrower.' In other words, the res which is the
subject of the lien provided in § 1 is the merchandise or stock in
trade, conceived of as a unit presently and continuously in existence
-a 'floating mass,' the component elements of which may be con-
stantly changing without affecting the identity of the res. ...
So conceived, it is not inconsistent with the existence of the lien
or floating charge on the inventory, as it may be made up at any
particular time, that the borrower is free to withdraw an item
from stock for sale in the regular course of business, without any
obligation to account to the lien holder for the proceeds. .
By analogy it might be possible to treat a merchant's accounts re-
ceivable as a unit presently and continuously in existence, the com-
petent elements of which (the particular accounts) may be
constantly changing, without affecting the identity of the res; so
that a general assignment by way of security of accounts receivable
present and future might be deemed to create in praesenti a lien
upon this enduring unit, the accounts receivable, which lien would
persist as a floating charge upon such res, however much its com-
ponent elements might change from time to time by the payment
88 186 F.2d 827 (1st Cir. 1951).
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of old accounts and the creation of new ones. But when the legis-
lative explicitness in § 1 . . . is contrasted with the language of
§ 5, it would be quite far-fetched to read into § 5 any such
sophisticated concept as suggested above." 87
Several months after the decision the New Hampshire legislature
amended the Factors Lien Act to provide for just such a general
assignment of accounts receivable. 8 Today both inventory and accounts
receivable are treated alike when utilized as collateral under the Factors
Lien Act. 9
The court in Roche speaks in terms of a continually existing res
which is presently assigned and the components of which are in a
constant state of change as new units are substituted for old units. This
"sophisticated concept" may differ somewhat from the notion of auto-
matic lien perfection on a future chattel or account under a chattel
mortgage with an after-acquired property clause, but there are strong
similarities. The lien under either concept dates from the original
perfection with no gaps during which any creditor can intervene."0
And such a case arising under the Factors Lien Act is a particularly
appropriate authority in attempting to predict the judicial treatment of
article 9 transactions when bankruptcy intervenes. The floating lien
sanctioned by the Code is derived in large part from the inventory and
accounts receivable financing provisions of the Factors Lien Acts; I
the Code has expanded the reach and scope of this floating lien to allow
the encumbrance of virtually all personal property.2
87 Id. at 831.
88 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 446:7 (1955).
89 It is interesting to note that the Factors Lien Act, despite the language of
"continuing lien," could have been interpreted to create something in the nature of
a Massachusetts-rule lien. The act uses language to the effect that the lien shall
exist upon all property "from time to time consigned to or pledged with" the factor.
This language could have been construed to require periodic statements to perfect
the after-acquired property. But in Colbath v. Mechanicks Nat'l Bank, 96 N.H. 110,
70 A.2d 608 (1950), the New Hampshire Supreme Court followed the Comet case
and declared that this language did not require any consignment or further act of
transfer to perfect.
90 The Factors Lien Act was designed to give prospective secured creditors a
safer means of financing than had previously existed under the chattel mortgage act.
New Hampshire had been a Massachusetts-rule state under chattel mortgage financing
and therefore a secured creditor using the mortgage always ran the risk of losing out
to an intervening creditor. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has recently com-
mented upon this development. Haskins v. Dube, 101 N.H. 224, 138 A.2d 677 (1958).
91 See UCC § 9-204, comment 3. The following 26 states now have Factors Lien
Acts: Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Indiana, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin. The Massachusetts and Penn-
sylvania Factors Lien Acts have been replaced by the Code. The Connecticut and
New Hampshire Acts will be replaced upon the effective date of the Code in those
states. See note 4 supra.
92 UCC § 9-204(4) lists the types of future property that cannot be made subject
to a security interest.
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THE IMPACT OF THE CODE ON PREFERENCE STATUS OF AFTER-
ACQUIRED PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS; THE ROLE OF
SECTION 9-108
Given this background, what result may be expected if and when
a trustee in bankruptcy challenges as a preference an after-acquired
property transfer under the Code?
Code security provisions make it absolutely clear that the first to
file notice has a secured claim that prevails over everyone except holders
of prior secured claims, 3 buyers in the ordinary course of business,
94
and later perfecting holders of purchase money interests in the after-
acquired property." A security interest perfected by filing is considered
to be continuously perfected by that notice; " the date of notice deter-
mines the time at which priority is establishedY7 Thus, by filing a notice
of intention to engage in a secured commercial transaction the creditor
may have his rights of priority pre-date the execution of the security
instrument itself. In effect the Code has applied to all permitted after-
acquired property transfers rules granting the security interest at least
as favorable priority status as that possessed by inventory and accounts
receivable transactions under the New York and New Hampshire
Factors Lien Acts. The Code's security interest, when perfected, is
continuously perfected as to all present and future personalty included
in the instrument; it is in all respects a "legal" interest.
What then is the function of section 9-108? This section was
designed to remove the perceived problem of the preferential transfer
in bankruptcy by providing that the debtor's acquisition of the collateral
in the ordinary course of business or under a contract of purchase en-
visaged by the security instrument will be deemed to effect a transfer
for contemporaneous value and not for antecedent debt. But analysis
of the background and circumstances surrounding after-acquired prop-
erty in the bankruptcy context will indicate that for this purpose section
9-108, however desirable its aim, is probably unnecessary and quite
possibly self-defeating.
(1) Section 9-108 Is Probably Unnecessary
If the Roche and Comet cases mean anything, they mean that there
can be inventory and accounts receivable financing free from attacks of
the trustee in bankruptcy under a financing device that is, for purposes
93 UCC § 9-312.
94 UCC § 9-307.
95UCC §9-312(3), (4).
96 UCC § 9-312 (6).
97UCC § 9-312(5).
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of discussion here, similar to that of article 9 of the Code. Since the
New York and New Hampshire Factors Lien Acts, then, have met with
success in avoiding the preference pitfall, there would seem to be no need
for section 9-108. Roche found its rationale in the fact that there was
a continuing res and that the lien attached to the res. Comet did not
even demand the construction of a res. It turned solely upon the fact
that the statute had provided for an automatically perfected lien and
that the after-acquired goods became subject to this continuing lien
once the original agreement was perfected. This last analysis, particu-
larly, is essentially no different than the construction of the chattel mort-
gage acts represented in the Alabama Braid, Claussen and Hayes cases;
in states with the automatic perfection rule security interests in after-
acquired property have escaped preference avoidance even in the absence
of specific statutory provision establishing a continuing lien. It is sub-
mitted that a court made cognizant of the nature of the Code's continu-
ing and floating legal lien 0 -- perfected at the execution and filing of
the financing instrument 99-should not be able to hold that a preferential
transfer has been effected. To find a preference the court would have
to take authority either from the legislative history of the 1938 and
1950 amendments or from the present language of section 60. Neither,
however, appears to support such a construction.
Legislative History
As indicated above, there were several evils at which the section 60
amendments were directed: the equitable lien of the Sexton variety
was one; the equitable lien arising out of after-acquired property trans-
fers under the Massachusetts rule was another. In both cases the exe-
cution of some supplementary act was by state law necessary to perfect
these liens as against third parties, and the doctrine of relation back
was essential for their survival in bankruptcy. They were secret liens,
unrecorded or unrecordable-or, at the least, liens to whose recordation
no statute gave the effect of constructive notice as covering the particular
property subsequently coming into the debtor's hands. But the auto-
matically perfected lien on after-acquired property was not thought to
be eliminated by the amendments, not, at least, in a state which sanc-
tioned such a transaction on inventory. In hearings before the House
Judiciary Committee considering the 1938 amendment, 100 Professor
98 See UCC § 9-204, comment 3.
99 UCC § 9-303(1).
100 Hearings before the Committee of the Judiciary of the House Studying The
Revision of the Bankruptcy Act, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 123 (1937).
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McLaughlin,' the chief draftsman, testified that a case like Thompson
was to be considered a preference under the 1938 act because the lien on
the after-acquired property was not perfected. But he asserted that
where a state, such as Michigan,"0 2 sanctioned a type of floating lien,
the 1938 act did not aim at depriving the mortgagee of his secured
interest in the future acquisitions. For such a lien there was, first, no
relation back and, second, complete perfection of the interest in the
after-acquired property. Given these, he reasoned, there was no prefer-
ence problem. His analysis seemed to focus upon the fact that there
was an element of substitution in such a case: 103 the old goods were
replaced by the new and hence not transferred for an antecedent debt.
But the fact that a state provides for automatic perfection of a lien
on after-acquired property would seem sufficient reason for coming to
the same conclusion. Whenever the original agreement embraces future
property, the lien is a continuing one, never defective, never secretive.
Just as the continuing lien on inventory shifts from old goods to new,
the automatically perfected non-inventory lien immediately reaches out
and attaches to each new acquisition. And whereas the lien on after-
acquired property in both inventory and non-inventory transactions is
always unperfected in the Massachusetts-rule states, it is never un-
perfected in the automatic-perfection states. But when the 1938 amend-
ment attacked the equitable lien on after-acquired property, it attacked
precisely the unperfected lien; there is no discussion in the hearings
about making preferential transfers out of the automatically perfected
lien. At a minimum the legislative history proves that the floating lien
concept on inventory was never deemed to be preferential. It is sub-
mitted that the automatic perfection doctrine is in essence a floating lien
doctrine allowing the lien to attach to all future acquisitions, whether
or not inventory. The use of automatic perfection terminology* is only
another way of describing a continuously perfected lien that floats to
any and all property embraced by the security agreement. It cannot be
doubted that the Factors Lien Acts fit squarely within the exemption
from preference attack noted by Professor McLaughlin; a fortiori the
Code, at least as to inventory and accounts receivable transactions, fits
into the same general framework.
101 The professor, who now spells his name MacLachlan, has elsewhere discussed
the 1950 amendment. MacLachlan, Preference Redefined, 63 HAgv. L. REv. 1390
(1950).
102 See Ferguson v. Wilson, 122 Mich. 97, 80 N.W. 1006 (1899) ; Gay v. Bidwell,
7 Mich. 519 (1859).
103 in McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 HARv. L. REv. 341,
379, 385-90 (1927), Professor McLaughlin had taken a position disfavoring after-
acquired property financing as to all but corporate debtors.
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Language of Section 60
Turning to the language of section 60, again there is every reason
to believe that Code transfers of future property will be non-preferential.
Section 60a(6) deals with equitable liens and declares them to
be contrary to the policy of the Bankruptcy Act."' But while the
Massachusetts-rule after-acquired property lien runs directly afoul of
this provision, neither the factor's lien nor the Code's security interest
comes within its purview. It is certain from both the language of the
Code and the nature of the secured status which it affords that its
security interest in after-acquired property is "not merely an 'equitable'
interest" 105; it is a recorded, immediate interest subject to no subse-
quent gap in perfection. A Code security interest could be preferential,
if at all, only under sections 60a (1) and (2) .106
In determining when a transfer of personalty has been effected,
section 60a(2) provides that it shall be considered to have been
made "at the time when it became so far perfected that no subsequent
lien upon such property obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on
a simple contract could become superior to the rights of the transferee."
Since the interest of the Code dates for priority purposes from the filing
of notice, there is no lien arising later than that time that can prevail
against the property--except, of course, a purchase money secured
interest °'0 7  As against lien creditors the security interest provided by
104 Section 60a(6) is quoted in relevant part in text below note 55 supra.
105 See UCC § 9-204, comment 2; Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article
of the Commercial Code, 16 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 27, 35 (1951).
106 Some support for this thesis is found in 3 COLLIER § 60.50. Discussing the
ordinary chattel mortgage on present property, Collier states: "If state law provides
that a transfer gives rise to a 'legal' lien, as in the case of the ordinary chattel mort-
gage, it does not come within § 60a(6) but is governed by § 60a(2), and is to be judged
as of the time it was perfected against subsequent lien creditors." Id. at 978. "And
will a recorded mortgage covering future property be considered 'perfected' as to the
future property? .... .Thus, in situations where there is a properly recorded mort-
gage purporting also to cover after-acquired property, the validity of the incumbrance
on such property depends largely on the equitable lien doctrine. Consequently, if
ecordation does not give constructive notice as to the after-acquired property, good
against both lien creditors and bona fide purchasers other than buyers 'in the ordinary
course of trade,' subsequent perfection of the attempted lien should be regarded as
preferential if the requisite elements are then present." Id. at 981. (Emphasis added.)
The Code, which avoids all talk of equitable liens, also meets the Collier requirements
of notice. Interestingly, it has been contended that even where the lien on after-
acquired property is deemed to be equitable (in a chattel mortgage situation),
§ 60a(6) might still fail to make the lien preferential. See Comment, 50 Nw. U.L.
Rxv. 541 (1955).
107 But such a claim cannot be deemed a "subsequent lien upon the property
. on a simple contract," Bankruptcy Act § 60a(2); rather it is something
in the nature of a prior claim arising against the property before the debtor acquires
it. A purchase money interest holder has to be made an exception among the persons
against whom filing will protect, in order to assure the debtor of'a further outlet for
secured financing. It would not seem that the "lien creditor" test of § 60a(2)




the Code is continuously perfected. The very acquisition of future
property by the debtor operates automatically to extend the secured
party's superior interest to that property, not through some later
supplemental action necessarily invoking the doctrine of relation back,
but by force of the after-acquired property clause of the security agree-
ment itself. That agreement constitutes a single unitary transaction
contemplating future acquisitions but whose future acquisitions, as part
and parcel of the original agreement, are immediately perfected seriatim;
they are not to be considered subsequent transfers for a then antecedent
debt since they are controlled by operation of law upon acts of the
parties consummated as of the date of execution and filing of notice of
the agreement.
108
(2) Section 9-108 Is Possibly Self-Defeating
The presence of section 9-108 indicates a concern by the draftsmen
that in the absence of some special gimmick after-acquired property
transfers would undergo serious danger of being regarded as pref-
erential. This concern apparently stems from the impression-created
perhaps by the predominance of Massachusetts-rule jurisdictions-that
all after-acquired property clauses create unperfected equitable liens
voidable in bankruptcy; the drafters failed to recognize the ample
precedent for immunity afforded by cases dealing with automatic
perfection transfers, especially under the Factors Lien Acts. But the
very existence of section 9-108 might therefore lead a court to conclude
that something in addition to original perfection is required, for if the
draftsmen have not determined that the Code transactions are of such a
nature as will fall without section 60, how can the court? At the least
108 See UCC § 9-204, comment 2. Claussen and Hayes, in chattel mortgage trans-
actions, and Roche, in a factors lien transaction, lend ample support to this proposition.
A recent case that illustrates well, in a somewhat different context, the concept of a
unitary transaction -is Wolf v. Aero Factors Corp., 126 F. Supp. 872 (S.D.N.Y.
1954), aff'd, 221 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1955). Pursuant to a type of factoring arrange-
ment (which is not detailed in the opinion) the bankrupt had assigned accounts
receivable to the secured creditor. Under the particular revolving credit arrangement
provided, some groups of accounts assigned within four months of bankruptcy turned
out to be uncollectible and others were of greater value than the loan extended for
them. The trustee claimed that only the credit extended at any one time was secured
by the particular accounts assigned at that time and by no others, so that a part of
the loan was unsecured even though the total amount of credit was less than the
outstanding and collectible collateral. The court, however, reasoning that the accounts
were assigned and credit extended pursuant to the terms of a master factoring agree-
ment which specifically allowed any excess collateral from any particular transaction
to offset any deficiency in collateral for any other transaction, held that since the
debits and credits were all part of a single agreement, the assignee could set off the
credit extended on worthless accounts against the excess of the other collateral under
§ 68 of the Bankruptcy Act. Some of the transfers of future accounts would seem
to have been in satisfaction of past indebtedness and thus preferential if the court
had not viewed the transactions as constituting a single unitary agreement.
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section 9-108 directs judicial attention to a problem which, it is sub-
mitted, does not exist.
Furthermore, in giving "new value" or contemporaneous value
status to security interests attaching upon future property acquisition,
the Code is clearly utilizing a fiction.109 There is thus strong likelihood
that a court might treat such concepts as a sham and, looking skeptically
at the time sequence of actual events, disregard the language. This
result would seem even more likely when one regards the "new value"
concept in the historical context of section 60: "new value" is in reality
a relation forward of the consideration given for the security instrument
to coincide with the acquisition of the future property-a mere reversal
of the concept of relation back which was a specific target of the 1938
and 1950 amendments. And all this is not idle worry. Many of the com-
mentators predict that section 9-108 will be treated as sham and that
a preference hazard will remain to face Code financers."'
(3) The Result Sought by Section 9-108 Is Commercially Desirable
In present day commercial practice some of the most inherently
valuable collateral is property to be acquired in the future "" and it
would seem desirable to allow a secured creditor to finance against that
property with safety. The Code itself attempts to free such financing
from the challenges of all creditors except those with prior claims and
perfected purchase money interests. But if a state adopts this principle
through the instrumentality of the floating lien, ought the federal bank-
ruptcy law to overturn such bona fide commercial transactions? What
109 The position taken by the National Commercial Finance Conference and the
Association of Commercial Discount Companies, as represented by their opinions
expressed in hearings before the NEw YORK LAW REvIsION COMMI EE, STUDY OF
UNIFORM Co RCL AL CODE, ARTICLE NINE 1033 (1954), is that § 9-108 creates a
fiction. Accord, Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 402, 417 n.44 (1958). But Everett, Securing
Security, 16 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 49, 55 (1951), states that this section has not
"called black white, called old value new," because in any event such financing is
typically done through revolving credit arrangements. See note 112 infra. This
observation, of course, fails to speak directly to the problem, which is concerned
precisely with the instance where the revolving credit plan is not in fact used.
110 The following articles express doubt as to the effectiveness of § 9-108:
Kripke, The Modernization of Commercial Security Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 16 LAw & CoNEmmP. PROD. 183 (1951); Kripke, The "Secured Transactions"
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 VA. L. REv. 577 (1949); Kupfer,
Accounts Receivable, Trust Receipt, and Related Types of Financing Under Article
Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 TEMP. L.Q. 278 (1953); Comment,
2 VUA. L. REv. 395 (1957) ; Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 402 (1958). All operate on
the assumption that in the absence of this section there exists a preference problem.
Everett, supra note 109, and Birnbaum, Article 9-A Restatement and Revision of
Chattel Security, 1952 WIs. L. REv. 348, are more optimistic about the fate of
§ 9-108, but they, too, proceed on the theory that there is a problem to be met.
111 In inventory and accounts receivable financing this is especially true. See
Lowenstein, Assignments of Accounts Receivable and the Bankruptcy Act, 1 RUTGERS
L. REv. 1 (1947) ; Note, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 392 (1952).
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a windfall to the general creditor who had long been on constructive
notice that the debtor's future assets were to be made a part of the
secured creditor's collateral! Custom and usage of financing under the
Code will provide such creditors with the experience necessary for deter-
mining whether or not to extend credit to a debtor who has executed
a security instrument covering after-acquired property. They need only
check the records to protect themselves. The preference section amend-
ments aimed at voiding secret and unperfected transactions. Certainly
the Code's security interest scheme is not vulnerable to these objections.
If the bankruptcy courts strike down Code after-acquired property
interests as preferences, secured creditors may have to finance against
future property by use of the revolving credit plan.112 Such a plan will
accomplish for the secured creditor the same result, but the financing
will be a much more expensive undertaking. Furthermore, the plan
necessitates policing, which the Code has dispensed with.13
If sound commercial practice is looked to to support the proposition
that Code transfers ought not to be voided as preferences, then section
9-108 does contain a meritorious limitation upon the class of property
whose encumbrance may be regarded as nonpreferential. The section
provides that only future property acquired "in the ordinary course of
business or under a contract of purchase made pursuant to the security
agreement within a reasonable time after new value is given" is to be
considered transferred for a new, not antecedent debt; this substantially
limits section 9-204 which would permit a financer to encumber virtually
all the debtor's property. By restricting protection to commercial trans-
actions, the draftsmen have recognized that a secured creditor is entitled
to rely on the general business assets of his debtor but not, as against the
trustee in bankruptcy, on unusual, uncontemplated acquisitiofis. Since
his secured financing envisioned only expected business turnover-
additions to and replacement of assets-his secured claim is to be treated
as a transfer for an antecedent debt as to unanticipated, remote or non-
business acquisitions by the debtor. This is more in accord with the
nature of the secured creditor's reliance. It is more in accord, also, with
the bankruptcy theme of equality of distribution,114 since, were the law
otherwise, the secured creditor alone would receive windfall benefits.
112 Under a revolving credit plan the practice is for the debtor to pay the pro-
ceeds of the sales or accounts to the secured creditor who makes an immediate
remittance of the proceeds back to the debtor in a formal exchange for the after-
acquired collateral. For a discussion of how this practice has obviated state law
restrictions on floating liens see Gilmore, mtpra note 105. See also Everett, mipra
note 109; Note, 101 U. PA. L. Rxv. 392 (1952).
113 Secured creditors police the transactions in any case when there is danger
of dishonesty or insolvency. See Note, 101 U. PA. L. Rsv. 392 (1952).
1143 ComnR § 60.01.
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The test provided, moreover, is flexible and can easily be adapted to the
operational needs of any business.
It is in this limitation indeed that section 9-108 has its true merit.
However, since a court might well regard the section as ineffective to
resist a preference challenge, its amendment should be recommended.
(4) Recommended Amendment of 9-108
In approaching the problem of amendment, we may borrow profit-
ably from the concepts developed in such cases as Mitchell and Roche.
It will be remembered that in Mitchell Mr. Justice Story, upholding the
present transfer of future property, analogized from the equity-sanc-
tioned assignment of expectancies and future claims. In a fairly recent
case involving such an assignment,11 5 a bankrupt had assigned, by a
transaction in the nature of a sale, the expectancy she might receive by
will or by intestacy from her father's estate. The assignment was made
some four years before her bankruptcy. Her father died the day follow-
ing bankruptcy, her expectancy then matured into a definitely determin-
able asset, and the trustee sued to set aside the transfer as a preference.
The Second Circuit, under the 1938 amendment to section 60, said that
New York law enabled an expectancy to be presently transferred even
though it could mature, if at all, only at some uncertain date in the
future. Under New York law a lien created by an after-acquired prop-
erty clause in a mortgage would have been deemed unperfected as
against lien creditors until possession was taken; the assignment of the
expectancy, on the other hand, was regarded as fully and completely
transferred at the date of assignment, and-if in a security instrument-
perfected as of that date. Thus the court would not consider the assign-
ment as in the nature of a transfer of after-acquired property. Rather
it was deemed to be a present transfer of something like a "present
right." In effect the court treated the assignment as if it were a transfer
of a present property right in a future contingency, because state law had
determined that such an expectancy was an existent res."' And in a
somewhat analogous case,"' 7 where there had been an assignment of
future payments that would be due under an existing but unperformed
bilateral contract, the court held that the payments which were made
115 In re Barnett, 124 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1942).
116The New York cases . . . showed that certain types of equitable liens,
especially those created by mortgages and pledges of after-acquired property, could
not withstand the onslaught of creditors who obtained judgment before the mortgagee
or pledgee took possession. . . . It is not our duty, of course, to explain why the
New York courts distinguish between the validity of mortgages and pledges of
after-acquired property, and assignments of expectancies." Id. at 1008.
"L7 Rockmore v. Lehman, 129 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1942).
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pursuant to the assignment within four months of bankruptcy were not
preferential. The court reasoned that there could be a present assign-
ment of the moneys to be earned because there was an underlying present
res, the contract, out of which the payments were to arise. This was a
present transfer even though the contract itself was not assigned and
the contract was still executory.
In both cases the court concerned itself primarily with the question
of whether or not state law recognized the transferability of these in-
tangibles. Once having decided that state law did permit their transfer,
it concluded that there was a present "property" or "right" or "interest"
that existed and was assigned. Under such an analysis, the court was
not concerned with the future property aspects of the transfers.18  New
York had determined for itself what should and what should not be
"future property." An expectancy is not future property but is a present
right of sorts. An assignment of future payments on an unperformed
contract is not a transfer of future property, but is a transfer of an
existing contract right." 9  New York might have said that these
118 New York law in this area is exceedingly complex and indeed almost irra-
tional. An assignment of a fund to be created if the debtor's license application is
denied and his money refunded is presently assignable and perfected. Capitol Dist.
Corp. v. 2131 Eighth Ave., Inc., 1 N.Y.2d 842, 135 N.E.2d 726 (1956). But the
assignment of a fund to be created by the refund of money upon cancellation of an
issued liquor license is not presently perfected. New York v. Bedford Bar & Grill,
Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 429, 141 N.E.2d 575 (1957). See also In re Modell, 71 F.2d 148
(2d Cir. 1934) (assignment of judgment of pending tort litigation one and one-
half years before verdict found to be preferential even under the pre-1938 § 60
because New York did not recognize the present perfection of such an assignment and
had no relation back doctrine to save the equitable lien on after-acquired property) ;
Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N.Y. 508 (1882) (assignment of future proceeds of pending
tort litigation held superior to subsequent attachment made after entry of arbitrator's
award but before date fixed for payment of award). When the transfer is found
"presently perfected" the courts seem to imply that there is a present property right
assigned; otherwise there is a "mere equitable lien" on future property-future prop-
erty that is found to be assignable but not perfected. In the Rockmore and Barnett
situations the court finds the future property linked to a present res of some sort
that makes the assignment perfected in presenti as well as transferred in presenti:
the court seems to discover something in the present that gives the future property
"potential existence." Once determined that the present res is good enough to
support the future contingency, it finds present perfection of the assignment. The
dissent in the Bedford case, mpra, is interesting: "While this is the rule [that lien
creditors can prevail] with regard to the mortgage or pledge of future crops or after-
acquired chattels, it is not the general rule, and neither the rule (as to such crops
and chattels) nor the reasons therefor have ever been applied by us to the assignment
of a fund which is to come into existence out of a present property right, and which
fund was advanced by the assignee. We have held, in a wide variety of circumstances,
that where the fund is to arise out of an existing relationship between the assignor
and the potential source of the fund, such an assignment is valid as against creditors
of the assignor who acquire liens after the fund comes into existence." 2 N.Y.2d at
435, 141 N.E.2d at 578. (Emphasis added; court's emphasis omitted.) See in this
connection note 119 infra.
319 Concerning the concept of future property presently perfectible as well as
presently assignable, with special regard to contract rights and accounts receivable,
see Lowenstein, supra note 111, at 8: "It is submitted, however, that the rule, grant-
ing present binding effect to an assignment of future book accounts to arise under
prospective contracts, has much in its favor and is consistent with the cases upholding
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transactions involved-like after-acquired property clauses in chattel
mortgages-transfers of future property. But New York had not.
And the bankruptcy court chose to treat the transfers as present
property. But if state law could make this determination and if the
bankruptcy court accepted state law distinctions, it would not seem
illogical to treat inventory, accounts receivable, and other commercial
future property transfers similarly. This is exactly what the Roche case
did for inventory under the New Hampshire Factors Lien Law. It
regarded the inventory as a continuing res and the future acquisitions
as potentially present because business operation necessitates inventory
turnover. The Factors Lien Act did not specifically construct the res
found by the court, but the act was read to provide it.
It is within this type of analytic framework that a recommendation
for amending the Code should be made. It is not clear whether the
Code in its present form will be construed to contain the concept of the
existing res. The similarity between the Code and the Factors Lien
Act has already been mentioned, but it must be remembered that the
Comet case did not interpret the New York Factors Lien Act in terms
of an existing res, and such a construction of the Code would seem
especially doubtful in view of the existing form of section 9-108, whose
relation-forward approach would be totally unnecessary under the Roche
analysis. It is therefore recommended that section 9-108 be amended to
read:
"Where a secured party makes an advance, incurs an obligation,
releases a perfected security interest, or otherwise gives new value
which is to be secured in whole or in part by after-acquired prop-
erty his security interest in the after-acquired collateral shall be
deemed a present transfer of a present expectancy interest in the
future property, if the debtor acquires his rights in such collateral
either in the ordinary course of his business or under a contract of
purchase made pursuant to the security agreement within a reason-
able time after new value is given.
Comment:
"The transfer of the future property is to be regarded as a present
transfer of an existing property right of 'potential' existence. It is
a present contingent property res. The existence of the debtor's
business furnishes the present property out of which the future
contingency can arise."
present assignments of other expectancy interests." See also Comment, 67 YALE L.J.
847, 860 (1958) : "But in many business contexts, future rights are no less susceptible
to description or less definite in value than future performances arising under exist-
ing contracts." Both articles advocate the free amenability of future properties to
presently perfectible assignments because of the potential existence grounded in their
existing relation to an established business practice.
